Introduction
Working memory is the temporary retention of a small amount of information, which is used in practically every kind of cognitive task. It is critical for learning and comprehension, and it has become a major area of brain research (e.g. Baddeley, 2003 ; Chein & Fiez, 2010 ; Cowan, 1995 Cowan, , 1999 Cowan, , 2009 D'Esposito, Postle, Jonides & Smith, 1999 ; Jonides et al., 2008 ; Majerus et al., in p ress ; McNabb & Klingberg, 2008; Todd & Marois, 2004 ; Xu & Chun, 2006 ) . The present review, however, summarizes the behavioural research on working memory. It includes a more detailed discussion of what working memory is and how it is used; limitations in working memory, and how one can use strategies to overcome them; the childhood development of working memory abilities, in which the basic abilities increase along with increasing uses of strategies to overcome 
Working memory and how it is used
Back in the days of the first few laboratories of psychological experimentation, Wilhelm Wundt was extensively studying conscious perception and thought in Leipzig, Germany. His work is still germane to modern psychology but much of it has still not been translated into English (only into Hungarian and Russian, the other two leading academic languages of the time and locale). William James, working from Harvard University, summarized the gist of much of the early research by Wundt and others in his 1890 text, Principles of Psychology . He noted two basic kinds of memory, primary and secondary. Primary memory referred to a lingering residue of our consciousness of recent events; that is, conscious awareness of what is and what recently was. In contrast, secondary memory referred to the nearly limitless amount of information stored away in the brain from a lifetime of experience. Primary memory is the core of what we now call working memory. American psychology went into a long era of concentrating on the lawful relationship between stimuli and responses, with little use for speculation about what happened in the brain or mind between those points. This attitude was furthered by what is known as Watson's ( 1913 ) behaviourist manifesto, and it continued until the cognitive revolution that began in the middle 1950s (Gardner, 1985 ) . As part of that cognitive revolution, George Miller ( 1956 ) wrote a seminal review paper on the basis of his own research in several areas, which did suggest that we can use experiments on behaviour to make important inferences about the properties of the mind and brain. He noted that there are severe limits in humans' ability to process information.
In some ways, the limits described by Miller ( 1956 ) resemble channel capacities of electronic communication devices that were studied in depth in the process of fighting the First and Second World Wars. For example, one cannot transmit a message as efficiently over a telegraph as one can over a radio because any one telegraph signal carries only a limited amount of information; a single dash or a dot only narrows down the choices for the letter that is about to be conveyed. Somewhat analogously, humans can identify a simple property such as the length of a line or the loudness of a tone only in a limited fashion: they can identify it out of about seven distinct choices, but not much more. The transmission of information is limited by the properties of the electronic device or human mind.
In a critical way, though, Miller ( 1956 ) also found that the human mind has a means to leap beyond the basic limits. If one is asked to repeat a list of, say, random letters, one can do so if there are at most about seven letters. If, however, one can capitalize on past knowledge, the letters can be organized into larger chunks in order to reduce the load on primary memory. Suppose a list of nine letters forms three well-known initialisms, as in the series IBM, CIA, FBI . Then it becomes an easy matter to retain the letters. So, the human mind is a device that organizes information and thereby allows much more efficient transmission or storage of information, compared to basic electronic devices.
The limits of working memory and the ability to overcome these limits both have profound implications for how learning is accomplished. A new concept requires that memory be put to use to form new amalgams. Take the concept of a fraction. The ratio 1:2 is the same as the ratio 3:6 and both pairs of numbers form an equivalent fraction, with a value of 0.5. When a child first endeavours to understand the concept of a fraction, the data that must be kept in mind (in working memory) include the first number, the second number and the comparative magnitude of the two (cf. Hecht, Vagi & Torgesen, 2007 ) . If the child loses sight of that principle, he or she might be swayed by the magnitude of one of the numbers rather than the comparative magnitude. The Further thoughts into how the mind uses information were articulated in a short book by Miller, Galanter and Pribram ( 1960 ) , who appear to have coined the term working memory. They noted that human activities must be planned and executed on many levels. In order to get to school in the morning, a child must think of all the activities that need to be finished first. These may include collecting homework and books, getting dressed, eating breakfast, brushing teeth and so on. Any one of these activities requires further thought, such as remembering where the homework was placed the night before, where the backpack was placed, perhaps a check as to whether the name is on the homework and so on. Miller and colleagues proposed that information about the overall plan (getting to school) and about subplans as they are enacted (loading the backpack or eating breakfast) are kept in a working memory as needed. One would test to see if the task was completed, at which point the details could be released from working memory, freeing it up for other parts of the overall plan. In this discussion, working memory was not considered a certain area in the brain or very specific mechanism, but rather the ensemble of whatever mental devices one can use to hold the information as needed for success in planning and carrying out daily activities.
In subsequent years, the concept of working memory was developed further. Atkinson and Shiffrin ( 1968 ) did not use that exact term, but they provided a seminal discussion of a short-term memory resembling James' ( 1890 ) primary memory. One important contribution they made was a careful consideration of how strategies might be used to enhance the limited amount of information in short-term memory. They suggested that the individual largely controls his or her brain's own flow of information from sensory memory to short-term memory to long-term memory, and back again (e.g. when long-term information is used to enrich the encoding of information in short-term memory). They modelled strategic processes such as covert maintenance rehearsal , in which an item is mentally re-entered into short-term or primary memory repeatedly to keep its representation from decaying. Also, covert elaborative rehearsal , the mental imposition of order and meaning to the materials in primary memory, helps with the retention of information in primary or working memory and also is a major way in which high-quality learning occurs. People using different strategies can often perform the same task in very different ways, leading to different patterns of results (Logie, Della Sala, Laiacona, Chalmers & Wynn, 1996 ) . Baddeley and Hitch ( 1974 ) wrote a book chapter entitled 'Working memory' that changed the field dramatically. They showed that it is an untenable oversimplification to think of working memory as a single entity as in James's ( 1890 ) primary memory or Atkinson and Shiffrin's ( 1968 ) short-term memory. Instead, they argued, different kinds of materials are stored separately. Verbal materials are stored in a faculty that is sensitive to phonological properties; for example, it is difficult to remember the order of words in a random list if the words all rhyme, as in cat, bat, hat, mat . . . etc. Visual, non-verbal materials, similarly, are stored in a faculty that is sensitive to visual or spatial properties. Therefore the interference between two stimuli in working memory depends to a large extent on whether they are encoded using similar features (both verbal or both visualspatial) or different features (one verbal and one visual-spatial). These working memory stores, now called the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad , were thought to preserve information automatically. It was thought that these stores hold information automatically, but only for a short time, about 2 seconds, unless it is rehearsed. (Lists of long words were not retained as well as lists of shorter words, suggesting that slowing down the rehearsal process allowed the information to decay from working memory before it could be rehearsed.)
Baddeley and Hitch suggested that there also would be a central working memory store that could hold ideas with the help of attention, but Baddeley ( 1986 ) later omitted that kind of storage 1 until he later was convinced of a definite need for it. Then he essentially re-introduced it as the episodic buffer , a kind of storage in which disparate components could be held, bound together, to form ideas in working memory (Baddeley, 2000 ) . This is the kind of working memory most closely aligned with information retrieved from long-term memory. Cowan ( 1988 Cowan ( , 1999 Cowan ( , 2001 ) raised the possibility that information is held in a manner that is less modular than in Baddeley's conception. There may be many types of working memory store (memory for the spatial locations of tones, memory for the body locations of touches and so on). For the time being, not knowing the true taxonomy, Cowan considered them to be myriad instances of a temporarily activated portion of long-term memory. Similar items interfere with one another more than different items do, as a general principle within this type of memory. In this conceptualization, instead of the episodic buffer, it is said that the focus of attention holds only a small number of items in an integrated form, whereas many features in long-term memory outside of the focus of attention can be temporarily activated at the same time, but in a lessintegrated form. According to this view, working memory is a composite that is centred on the few items or chunks of information currently in the focus of attention, plus a great deal more information that is readily accessible but is not at present within the person's focus of attention and awareness (recently spoken ideas, events within the last few seconds, etc.).
Given that learning depends heavily on working memory, it is important to know what aspect of working memory changes with childhood development and to incorporate this information to formulate the best educational practices. Recent work suggests that more items can be held in something like the focus of attention, and other recent work suggests that the process of rehearsing or refreshing information to keep its representations active increases in speed and efficiency with age. Before we get into all that, let us discuss in greater depth the limitations of working memory and how they can be overcome.
9.3 Limitations in working memory and how they are overcome
Item limits
The scientific understanding of working memory depends a great deal on finding the laws by which its capabilities are limited. How do we know that there exists a working memory in the brain that functions separately from long-term or secondary memory? We can establish this, it seems, only by showing that there is a temporary quality of working memory that is subject to some limits that can be specified. Miller ( 1956 ) pointed to an item limit, in particular about seven items. However, the work of Baddeley and Hitch ( 1974 ) showed that this limit was not so absolute, but varied with properties of the items to be remembered, such as how similar they were to one another and how long it took to pronounce each one. The inability to state fixed limits of working memory even has provided a space for some investigators to suggest that there is no separate working memory mechanism per se, just memory with a general set of principles and the attention processes that operate upon memory (e.g. Nairne, 2002 ) .
In a way, too, Miller's ( 1956 ) paper consumes itself, in that the chunking principle casts doubt on the meaning of the capacity limit. On one hand, it is suggested that people can remember about seven items. On the other hand, it is suggested that people can combine items to come up with larger chunks, which allows more items to be recalled. When people recall about seven items, how do we know that they are not rapidly forming chunks to assist in their performance? This would, for example, explain why it is helpful that telephone numbers are presented with a dash between the first three and the remaining four digits. Perhaps this is accomplished mentally for lists that are presented without grouping. The experimenter may present to the research participant the 34-52-168 . Indeed, Broadbent ( 1975 ) suggested that when one looks for lists that elicit perfect performance rather than performance that is correct only some of the time, one finds that lists of three items usually fit the bill. Cowan ( 2001 ) greatly extended this reasoning, suggesting that when grouping and rehearsal strategies are not possible, adults usually recall only three to five items, not the five to nine that Miller suggested. Chen and Cowan ( 2009 ) recently have had considerable success in showing that this line of reasoning from Broadbent ( 1975 ) is correct. Chen and Cowan taught individuals novel writtenword parings (like brick-dog ) to a 100 % correct criterion, so that these word pairings could be considered two-item chunks. Other words were introduced as one-item chunks for a fair comparison. Then the words were presented in lists, which varied in several ways. They could comprise four, six, eight, or 12 singletons. They also could comprise four or six learned pairs. This study showed that it is necessary to remove rehearsal in order to see the chunk capacity limit. When nothing was done to remove rehearsal, the number recalled was somewhat variable from one condition to the next. Participants in a different group, though, were required to recite a simple word repeatedly, twice per second ( the, the, the . . .) while reading the stimuli. What was observed in this group was that almost exactly three chunks were recalled, disregarding the correctness of the order of words in recall. This was the case no matter whether these three chunks were singletons or learned pairs. This finding is exactly what Broadbent ( 1975 ) would have predicted. The review of Cowan ( 2001 ) may have overestimated the limit just slightly, by including procedures in which strategies were not completely eliminated.
Cowan and colleagues ( 2005 ) showed that measures of the capacity limit are fairly well correlated with indices of successful learning, such as high school class rank and achievement scores, as well as with more basic tests of intelligence.
It is probably not be only the number of items in working memory that is limited, but also the number of relationships between items. Suppose I tell you that in Spain, cookies have more flour than sugar whereas in Italy, cookies have more sugar than flour. (It is a completely fabricated example.) Understanding this two-way interaction of country with the ratio of ingredients is difficult, as it requires the mental coordination of two of these variables: the relation between sugar and flour, and the dependence of that relation on the country. Halford, Baker, McCredden and Bain ( 2005 ) demonstrated that there is a strict limit in the human ability to understand higherlevel interactions, even when all of the elements appear together on a printed page so that only the relationships have to be held in memory. Perhaps the basic limit in the understanding of complex ideas depends on the same memory faculty as the limit in chunks (Halford, Cowan & Andrews, 2007 ) . Regardless, the important point is that the complexity of thought is highly dependent in some way on working memory capacity.
Goal maintenance limits
Adults' ability to hold in working memory only about three chunks of information seems rather restrictive. Making matters worse, it is not a foregone conclusion that working memory will always be filled with the most relevant information. A child in the classroom is often supposed to be using working memory to form new long-term knowledge. For example, in a history class, the various details are supposed to be used to paint a mental picture of an era, a series of events, or a movement over time. But here the child's motivation and ability to concentrate is critical. To the extent that irrelevant thoughts such as goings-on outside of the classroom, a classmate's whispering, or daydreams are allowed to enter the focus of attention and dominate working memory, the effort to acquire a new concept or idea will be sabotaged as some of the needed information is edged out of the focus of attention. Two studies of individual differences illustrate well this principle of the potentially damaging effects of irrelevant information. One study (Kane & Engle, 2003 ) made use of the Stroop effect, based on a task in which participants are to name the colour in which colour words are written. If, say, the word red is written in blue on the computer screen, the assigned task is to say 'blue' but the tendency in adults is to want to say 'red' because word reading has become more automatic and faster than colour naming. The task is especially difficult if the word and colour match for most of the stimuli, which can lull the participant into reading words instead of maintaining the goal of naming the actual colours in which those words are printed. The task was administered to individuals with high and low working memory spans, as tested on a standard operation span task that requires concurrent storage and processing of information (words and mathematics problems, respectively). Low spans did poorly on the Stroop task compared to high-span individuals because low spans failed to maintain the goal as consistently. They more often were swayed by the word in place of its printed colour.
In another study on inhibition with a very different experimental technique (Vogel, McCollough and Machizawa, 2005 ) , arrays of bars were presented and the task was to keep in mind the orientation of each bar. Actually, some bars were presented on the left and others on the right, and a cue indicated which side was to be retained in memory (without actually moving the eyes away from a centre fixation). This arrangement allowed the measurement of an electrical brain response, or event-related potential, to the task of holding the information in working memory. The more items held in working memory, the larger the magnitude of an event-related response component called contralateral delay activity (CDA). On the side of the display to be remembered, moreover, there were often some bars that could be neglected (perhaps the red ones) and other bars that had to be remembered (perhaps the green ones). The CDA magnitudes indicated that low-span individuals kept in mind both the relevant and the irrelevant items, whereas the high-span individuals excluded the irrelevant items from memory and therefore kept more of their working memory capacity free. In other situations, this freed-up working memory in the high spans presumably could be put to use for the sake of learning more. Kane et al. ( 2007 ) showed that this ability to exclude irrelevant information plays an important role in actual life. Participants carried around small devices on which they were cued to respond from time to time regarding whether they were paying attention to what they were doing or their minds were wandering. Low-span individuals reported their minds wandering, against their will, more often than did high spans. There was no difference between the two when they deliberately were allowing their minds to wander; in low spans, it was involuntary mind-wandering that was in excess.
Time limits
The press towards the belief that there are time limits in addition to, or instead of, item limits started early within the field of cognitive psychology. Peterson and Peterson ( 1959 ) found that even something as simple as a consonant trigram was forgotten precipitously across 18 seconds filled with a demanding distracting task to prevent rehearsal, counting backwards. Some recent studies, though, would attribute this loss to the presence of interference from the digits presented in the backward-counting task. Lewandowsky, Duncan and Brown ( 2004 ) have presented lists to be recalled, in conditions in which the participant was to repeat one word once ( super ) or several times in a row ( super, super, super ) before recalling each word. This was done to vary the time before recall without introducing new interference in the more delayed recall condition. No effect of the time before recall was obtained. Even when a third, attention-demanding task was added , little difference was seen in the loss of memory from one word In contrast to this research finding, Barrouillet and colleagues (e.g. Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe & Camos, 2007 ; Portrat, Barrouillet & Camos, 2008 ) have findings that seem to require that there is loss of memory over time; but that is indirect reasoning. They have manipulated the time between items during their presentation and have shown that they can measure the proportion of time between items that is taken up with a distracting task. In one task, for example, letters are to be recalled but numbers between them are to be read. The time from the beginning of the presentation of each number until it is pronounced by the participant is assumed to be engaged in that task, and therefore unavailable for refreshing or rehearsing the letters to be recalled. It turns out that it is not the amount of time between items to be recalled that is critical, but rather the cognitive load defined as the proportion of time taken up by the distracting task. The higher the cognitive load, the lower the span, in a close linear relation. This was taken to suggest that information is lost over time unless it is refreshed, and that it cannot be refreshed during the distracting task.
Tests are under way to adjudicate between these views on the presence versus absence of decay. Meanwhile, though, it has become clear that there is some sort of memory loss over time in certain other situations. Ricker and Cowan ( 2010 ) presented a concurrent array of three unconventional characters followed by a pattern mask to eliminate sensory memory and then, in one condition, a blank interval of 1.5, 3, or 6 seconds. This was followed by a probe to test recognition of one randomly-selected item from the three-item array. The basic finding was that memory declined across retention intervals despite the absence of any interference. In contrast, though, arrays of six English letters were not forgotten across a 6-second interval. Zhang and Luck (2009) found that array memory loss over a number of seconds is not a loss of the precision of each item but rather a loss of items, and that it occurs suddenly for items that are lost. It appears from these studies that the loss over time may occur for items that are not easily categorized, and that categorical information such as letter arrays may persist longer over time.
A basic educational implication of these findings is that it is utterly important for the learner to have good categories for the information that is being presented, or it may well tend to fade from memory within a matter of seconds.
Overcoming the limits
What makes human cognition capable is its flexibility. We have already discussed the fact that learning to chunk items together increases the amount of information that can be saved by increasing the number of item per chunk, so that more information can be packed into the same limited number of chunks (Chen & Cowan, 2009 ; Miller, 1956 ) . In processing ordinary language, a structure is built up as one listens to or reads the sentence, which allows quite a bit of material to fit into the limited number of chunks in working memory (see Tulving & Patkau, 1962 ) . A dramatic demonstration of this principle is the work of Ericsson, Chase and Faloon ( 1980 ) . They taught a participant to increase his digit memory span over the course of a year from six or seven items, a normal ability, to more than 80 items. Subjective reports suggested that he was able to do this because he started with knowledge of many athletic records. He was able to recode the digits into chunks based on such records (e.g. 3:57.2, a former world record for running a mile). In this way, he raised his span to about 20 items. After that, he learned how to make higher-level chunks out of the primary chunks and, in that way, raised his span to about 80 items. Yet, this increase was very specific and, when he was switched to letter materials, he again could recall only about six of them. Further studies have indicated that, despite the fantastic performance, memory experts still base their performance on a basic memory capacity that is around three or four chunks; it is just that each chunk is very densely packed with information (Ericsson, Delaney, Weaver & Mahadevan, 2004 ; Wilding, 2001 ) . Another strategy for remembering information is to rehearse it covertly. If the information is in a verbal form and the serial order of the information has to be retained, this retention is aided considerably by rehearsal, provided that the items to be rehearsed are phonologically distinct (e.g. not composed of rhyming words) and can be recited in about 2 seconds (Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 1975 ) . This was attributed at the time to a phonological memory trace that decays in about 2 seconds unless it is refreshed through rehearsal, though others would now suggest that the basis of the effect is phonological interference (e.g. Neath & Nairne, 1995 ; . If the order of items does not have to be retained, what is found is that the first few items receive special rehearsal that is carried on until the list ends; this has been observed in studies in which the participants must rehearse aloud (Rundus, 1971 ; Tan & Ward, 2000 ) .
Perhaps grouping and rehearsal work together, or perhaps they are completely separate strategies. In any case, these strategies account for why memory span tests typically show people remembering about seven items, not three items as Chen and Cowan ( 2009 ) found with rehearsal prevented and grouping controlled.
It is possible to refresh items in memory without using a verbal form of rehearsal; not all materials lend themselves to verbal rehearsal. Another mnemonic device is to use attention to refresh the information in working memory, presumably by re-entering the information into the focus of attention (Cowan, 1999 ; Raye, Johnson, Mitchell, Greene & Johnson, 2007 ) .
As mentioned earlier, various kinds of thinking depend heavily on working memory. It is noteworthy that new or abstract problems make a higher demand on working memory than problems in which one's past knowledge can be applied, as the knowledge allows the problem to be represented with fewer separate chunks of information. Take the famous example of the four-card task (Wason & Shapiro, 1971 ). An abstract example of this task might be as follows. You have four cards, each with a number on one side and a letter on the other side. The cards are displayed with 4, 7, E and X showing. You wish to determine whether the following rule describes these four cards: If a card has an even number on one side, it has a vowel on the other side. Which cards need to be turned over to test the rule? This would be a good time to come up with an answer on your own before reading on. This is actually a difficult problem for most people. Turning over the 4 card is important because the rule requires that it have a vowel on the other side. People generally get that. Turning over the 7 card is unimportant because the rule says nothing about cards with an odd number on one side. Turning over the E card is unimportant because the rule does not state what is on the other side of cards with an odd number; therefore, neither an even nor an odd number on the other side would disconfirm the rule. Finally, turning over the X is important because an even number on the other side would disconfirm the rule. People often mistakenly think that it is the E, and not the X, that needs to be turned over.
It can be argued that working memory is really challenged by this problem. It strains working memory to retain the rule while figuring out what each possible outcome would indicate in relation to the rule. This difficult problem becomes a lot easier, though, if common knowledge is used. Suppose, for example, that the problem is as follows. A certain car repair shop services Hondas and Buicks (as has been the case in Columbia, Missouri). A recall announcement indicates that the accelerator pedals on the Hondas can stick, potentially leading to accidents and therefore warranting repair. Four customer cards are sitting on the desk. Each one indicates the customer's name and the brand of car on one side and, on the other side, whether the accelerator pedal has been checked. The four cards as placed on the desk show Honda, Buick, checked, and not checked . Which cards need to be turned over? It is obvious upon a moment's thought that the Honda and the not-checked cards need to be turned over. This would be obvious even if this problem were given before the abstract one. However, it is logically the same problem as the more abstract one. As Wason and Shapiro ( 1971 ) showed, a problem based in knowledge is much easier than the same problem expressed in an abstract manner. Making the best use of students' knowledge, as well as encouraging retention strategies, is critical for fostering learning and comprehension.
Often, abstract terms cannot be avoided because the domain of a problem is new. In fact, it could be argued that the point of a test of fluid intelligence is to examine how well an individual is able to cope with a problem that he or she has not encountered before (a working-memoryintensive enterprise). One reason that intelligence test scores appear to have increased over time worldwide, for example from the 1950s to the 1990s, may be that people these days have varied experiences that make the tests invalid inasmuch as the types of problems on the intelligence tests are not as unfamiliar as they once were in a previous generation (cf . Flynn, 2007 ) .
When a problem is new or unfamiliar and working memory is insufficient to allow an individual to solve it easily, the individual may fall back upon several very common thinking strategies (albeit often unknowingly). These strategies often work but they also are fraught with danger. One strategy is to use a heuristic, a rule of thumb that yields the correct answer often, though certainly not always (Kahneman, 2003 ) . For example, it can be effortful and working-memory-intensive to evaluate a political argument; less effortful to typecast the speaker based on political affiliation, emotional tone or the similarity of the speaker to oneself. Another strategy that is often used is to rely on social consensus. It may not give you the correct answer, but at least it gives you the answer that is easiest to obtain and that results in little friction with those around you. Even one's basic perceptual judgements (such as judging the length of a line) apparently can be influenced by what others say (Asch, 1956 ) . One of the most important tasks of the educational system may be to make students aware of these cognitive pitfalls and train them to exert more effort so that their working memory can be put to best use in obtaining the most valid answers, rather than the answers that are simply easiest to obtain or are the most comfortable.
Development of working memory
It has been clear for a very long time that there is profound developmental growth in what is now called memory span (Bolton, 1892 ) . It has, however, been much more difficult from an analytic point of view to figure out exactly which basic working memory mechanisms change with development (Cowan & Alloway, 2009 ). Nevertheless, some important progress has been made recently.
Growth of capacity
Neo-Piagetian psychologists have long believed that the fundamental basis of cognitive development is an increase in working memory ability, expressed either as increasing energy that allows more items to be held in the attention-based part of working memory as children develop (PascualLeone, 2005 ; Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969 ) or in an increasing ability to keep in mind the relations between elements and therefore comprehend information of greater complexity (Andrews, Halford, Bunch, Bowden & Jones, 2003 ) .
One difficulty in supporting the premise that capacity, expressed as the number of chunks in memory, increases with age is that there are other explanations of basic performance increases over age. It could be that what increases with age is only the ability to build larger chunks, in order to use the same basic chunk capacity more efficiently. However, Gilchrist, Cowan and NavehBenjamin ( 2009 ) were able to show that, in one circumstance at least, this is not the case; there is true development of chunk capacity. They presented for verbatim, spoken recall lists of short, 1 simple spoken sentences that were unrelated to one another (e.g. take your paper and pencil; our neighbour sells vegetables; thieves took the painting; drink all of your milk). The length of the materials made it impractical to use verbal rehearsal to remember the items (Baddeley, 1986 ) , which presumably forced participants to use a chunk-limited capacity. Presumably, each sentence forms a separate chunk of information, with strong links between words in a chunk and very weak links, if any, between chunks. The beauty of this stimulus set-up is that it was possible to estimate not only the number of chunks, but also the integrity of chunks in memory. It turned out that the children from the first grade (aged 6-7 years), children from the sixth grade (aged 11-12 years) and adults all formed sentence chunks that were equally good. In particular, for participants of any age, if any substantive part of a short sentence was recalled, about 80 % of the sentence was recalled. Yet, the number of such sentences recalled increased from an average of about 2.5 in first-grade children to about 3.0 in adults. This reflects a small but probably rather important growth in basic working memory capacity. Of course, capacity may be smaller in children too young to test in this procedure. Increase in the basic capacity might account for developmental increase in the complexity of propositions and materials that can be retained and understood during development (e.g. Andrews et al., 2003 ; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998 ; Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969 ) .
Growth of goal maintenance
One of the most important aspects of the development of working memory is the increasing ability to ignore irrelevant information and focus on more relevant information. For example, Elliott ( 2002 ) visually presented lists of digits for recall, either in silence or in the presence of various speech backgrounds. When the background consisted of a variety of spoken words (red, blue, green, yellow, white, tall, big, short, long) this background had an effect that was quite devastating in second-grade (age 7-8) children, reducing their proportion correct on the digit recall task from about 70 % to about 30 % (Elliott, 2002 , figure 1 ). Each participant was tested with lists of a length based on his or her own pre-determined span. Despite that adjustment, the effect of irrelevant speech diminished with development so that, in adults, the effect of irrelevant speech was less than a 10 % reduction.
There are two slightly different interpretations of this finding by Elliott ( 2002 ) , and other findings like it. For the young children was the distracting speech just intrusive? Or did the distracting speech actually make the children lose sight of the goal, which was to remember the printed digits and not the spoken words? That is not clear but, at least in some circumstances at least, young children actually do lose the goal. Zelazo ( 2003 ) has summarized a series of studies in which children must sort a deck of cards according to some rule (e.g. rabbits here, whether red or blue; cars over there, whether red or blue). After a while, the task switches to sorting on a different basis (e.g. red things here, whether cars or rabbits; blue things over there, whether cars or rabbits). The striking finding is that 3-year-old children can explain the new sorting rule, but nevertheless continue to sort according to the old rule. The old rule has become a too-compelling habit to overcome, given the apparently relatively weak support from the new rule, which may temporarily drop out of working memory.
Given these results, and many others on children's difficulty in inhibiting irrelevant information to focus on the most relevant information and task goals (e.g. Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990 ; Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan & Tannock, 1999 ) , one might wonder if we really know that chunk capacity also increases with age. Perhaps young children have just as much capacity, but fill it with irrelevant materials. A study by Cowan, Morey, AuBuchon, Zwilling and Gilchrist ( 2010 ) argues against that as a general interpretation; a growth of the inhibition or filtering out of irrelevant information cannot be the entire explanation of developmental change. Cowan et al. presented arrays with both more-relevant and less-relevant items to be remembered. Participants were sometimes, for example, to remember the colours of the circles and ignore the colours of the triangles. Occasionally, however, they were tested on the less-relevant shape. With two morerelevant and two less-relevant items in the array, children in first and second grades (6-8-yearolds) allocated their attention as efficiently as older children and adults. All groups favoured the more-relevant items by very similar amounts. However, the younger children simply remembered fewer items than did older children or adults, which held true for both the better-remembered, more-relevant items and the poorly-remembered, less-relevant items. Just as Gilchrist et al. ( 2009 ) showed that chunking ability could not explain away an apparent growth in basic capacity, Cowan et al. showed that the allocation of attention to filter out irrelevant items cannot explain away this growth in basic capacity. The smaller capacity and poorer goal maintenance of younger children together have profound implications for education. Gathercole ( 2008 ) describes applied studies in the classroom in which she and her colleagues have found that what appeared on the surface to be cases of children's disobedience, rebellion or incomprehension often must be attributed instead to working-memorybased failures, such as forgetting the instructions, not keeping in mind the task goal or not recalling information critical to the successful completion of an assigned task or academic activity.
Despite the poignant observations and anecdotes contributing to this connection between working memory and school performance, one might wonder whether the contribution of working memory is specific. After all, various kinds of working memory tests are highly correlated with the intelligence quotient (IQ) and other aptitude and achievement tests in children (e.g. Cowan et al., 2005 ) . The contributions of working memory and general intelligence can be disentangled, however, using regression techniques. Alloway and Alloway ( 2010 ) examined children at 5 years of age and again at 11 years. They found that literacy and numeracy at 11 years were predicted by working memory even after taking into account IQ. It was also the case that literacy and numeracy were predicted by IQ even after taking into account working memory, but the contribution of IQ was smaller than that of working memory. Alloway ( 2009 ) tested children between 7 and 11 years of age who were identified as having learning difficulties, and found even more striking results. The children were tested at intervals 2 years apart. In this sample, Alloway found that working memory at the first test accounted for subsequent learning even after taking into account IQ, but the reverse was not true: after taking into account working memory, IQ made no further contribution. It seems safe to say that educators must attend to issues involving working memory in order to understand academic performance in children.
Growth of memory persistence over time
There are a few studies indicating that memory for acoustic sensation, exactly how a noise or word sounds, may persist longer in older children than in young children. Keller and Cowan ( 1994 ) found that the duration of tone pitch memory increased from first grade (6-7-years-olds) to adulthood. Cowan, Nugent, Elliott and Saults ( 2000 ) presented lists of spoken digits to be ignored while a silent rhyming game was carried out and occasionally presented a cue to switch from the game to recall of the last spoken list, which had ended 1, 5, or 10 seconds before the cue. Lists were adjusted for the child's memory span for attended digits. It was found that forgetting of ignored digits across the retention intervals was equivalent for all ages, for most of the list; but that forgetting of the very last digit in the list across the retention intervals was much more severe for younger children than for older participants. This suggests that the sensory memory, which is uninterrupted only for the final list item, fades more quickly in younger children. More research 
Growth of strategies
Finally, there has been a great deal of research showing that the ability to use mnemonic strategies to overcome the limitations increases markedly across age groups in childhood. It is not fully clear exactly why this growth occurs but there are leads. Many studies have shown that young children are unable to engage in covert verbal rehearsal in a sophisticated manner (Flavell, Beach & Chinsky, 1966 ; Ornstein & Naus, 1978 ) . One possibility is that they are just unaware that rehearsal would help performance. Against that interpretation, attempts to train children to rehearse, or to recite items more quickly, have not been very successful (e.g. Cowan, Saults, Winterowd & Sherk, 1991 ; Hulme & Muir, 1985 ) . Instead, it could be that a certain working memory capacity is necessary in order to make these strategies work effectively. Two different findings in extremely different age groups support this hypothesis. First, in memory span tasks, young children recite items more slowly than young adults, and it was possible that this slower recitation could be allowing time for decay. Against that possibility, Cowan, Elliott et al. ( 2006 ) were able to get children to speed up so that they recalled digits in a list at an adult-like rate, but still their memory span did not improve. Second, at the other end of the age spectrum, Kynette, Kemper, Norman and Cheung ( 1990 ) found that older adults cannot rehearse as quickly and do not remember as much as young adults, even though there is no reason to assume that aging causes a loss of knowledge about the efficacy of particular mnemonic strategies. It seems reasonable to conclude that the growth of working memory capacity in children and its decline in old age both may affect the ability to use certain mnemonic strategies effectively, in opposite directions; and that the effects of age cannot be explained by the appreciation of the potential use of such a mnemonic strategy. Barrouillet et al. ( 2007 ) found that memory in young adults depended on the cognitive load imposed by items in a secondary task between the items to be recalled. They suggested that this occurs because free time is used to attentionally refresh items in memory (Raye et al., 2007 ) . This leaves open several potential bases of developmental growth. The basis may depend on the age range in childhood. Barrouillet, Gavens, Vergauwe, Gaillard and Camos ( 2009 ) found that 5-yearold children were sensitive to the presence or the absence of any distraction between items to be recalled, but were not sensitive to the cognitive load. This would be expected if these young children do not use the attentional-refreshing process (or any kind of rehearsal) that would be interrupted by the cognitive load. In contrast, 7-year-olds were sensitive to cognitive load. Moreover, the quality of attentional refreshing activities apparently continued to improve with age inasmuch as14-year-olds' spans increased with increasing free time to refresh items more quickly than did younger children's spans. Moreover, some factor other than cognitive load appears to have contributed to age differences in recall, as well. That other factor may be the basic working memory capacity.
Finally, Cowan, Saults and Morey ( 2006 ) found that the simple strategy of verbal rehearsal sometimes can be put to good use in sophisticated ways to enhance performance in a complex task. Illustrating their procedure, suppose you need to remember temporarily the names and locations of five cities in the eastern United States. That is a lot of name-place associations to hold in working memory. Sometimes, however, adults use a simpler strategy. It is not difficult for them to form a mental route from one location to the next; and it is not difficult for them to rehearse five 1 city names. Then it is possible for them to use these two relatively effortless forms of working memory together; the first name goes with the first map location, and so on. That memorization strategy, breaking up a complex situation into simpler, verbal and spatial sub-problems, of course is unavailable to children too young to use rehearsal well.
Working memory and maximized education
The lessons from this review of working memory and its development are fairly clear. It is necessary to pitch any kind of education to a level that the student can comprehend, and the ability to assess this comprehension is improved by an appreciation of how closely it may depend on working memory abilities. Failure of working memory must be kept in mind as a possible explanation of any cognitive shortcoming in the classroom or as a basis, at least in part, for learning disabilities. A student's existing knowledge can be used to overcome working memory limits in many situations. One also can try to teach better learning skills and mnemonic strategies, all the while keeping in mind that the successful implementation of a strategy itself may depend on a certain working memory capacity. In recent studies, there has been a suggestion that challenging working memory tasks, carried out repeatedly and with the challenges increasing as the participant improves, can be used to train working memory and attention. It is also said to have positive benefits for other aspects of performance, raising intelligence tests and helping to overcome attention deficit disorders (e.g. Klingberg, 2010 ; Tang et al., 2007 ) . This has been in contrast to most prior studies in cognitive psychology, in which the benefits of training and practice have been found to be somewhat narrow (e.g. Boron, Willis & Schaie, 2007 ; Ericsson et al., 1980 ) . Perhaps what is learned in the newer training studies is that, by applying effort and attention repeatedly and persistently, one can improve one's performance on just about any task. It is thought, for example, that a difference in attitude helps to explain why Asian children learn mathematics with much more proficiency on average than children in the United States. They learn that if one does not do well in mathematics, one must work harder; US children, generally, tend to believe that some people are just not good at math (Chen & Stevenson, 1995 ) .
If working memory training or some other challenging training in a game-like form can help to overcome biases such as the belief that one is just not good at certain tasks, such training will be well worth while. Perhaps it might even help children to become citizens who are willing to use their effort and working memory to formulate and carry out the best possible decisions for our society, without an over-reliance on simplistic heuristics, biases or prejudices, and social convention or popular approval. 
